The public power spillover in technology markets – does it leave room for any competition?
In a general fashion, even though trying different logics of argumentation, competition law proves its limits when it comes to having the effects spilled over activities carried out by undertakings invested with public powers purposes. From a policy perspective this represents a predictable finality; however, in arguing on the same facts, the methodological stance used by the Union’s judiciary differs depending on the appetite towards formalistic or modern, economic-based argumentations. Even though the outcome (i.e. decision) might seem the same, the tests applied are of great importance for shaping a future, more efficient, competition legal infrastructure.
Table of contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. All the way to «Selex»
- 3. Eurocontrol l – a conflicting outcome
- 4. Being considered an undertaking and the limits to the assessment
- 5. «Selex» and the General Court’s detailed approach
- 5.1. No market or innovation market?
- 5.2. Competition on merits or unfair advantage?
- 5.3. Assisting on an opened market
- 5.4. Alleged abuse of dominance
- 6. CJEU – a holistic and abstract view
- 7. Conclusions
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